In this paper, the modal logic interpretation of plausibility and belief measures on an arbitrary universe of discourse, as proposed by Harmanec et al., is further developed by employing notions from set-valued analysis. In a model of modal logic, a multivalued mapping is constructed from the accessibility relation and a mapping determined by the value assignment function. This multivalued mapping induces a plausibility measure and a belief measure expressed in terms of conditional probabilities of inverse and superinverse images, or equivalently, in terms of conditional probabilities of truth sets of possibilitations and necessitations. Restricting to a ®nite universe of discourse, multivalued interpretations of basic probability assignments and of commonality functions are also obtained, in terms of conditional probabilities of pure inverse and subinverse images, or equivalently, in terms of conditional probabilities of truth sets of particular logical expressions involving possibilitations and necessitations. Ó
Introduction
Modal logic is an extension of classical propositional logic. Its language consists of a set of atomic propositions, logical connectives and modal operators of possibility and necessity. A standard model of modal logic is a triplet consisting of a set of possible worlds, a binary relation on this set of worlds, which is usually called accessibility relation, and a value assignment function, by which, for each world, truth or falsity is assigned to each atomic proposition. Harmanec et al. [10] have developed an interpretation of plausibility and belief measures in the framework of serial models of modal logic, in terms of probabilities of truth sets of possibilitations and necessitations.
Dempster [8] has shown that a multivalued mapping from a universe X into a universe Y carries a probability measure de®ned over subsets of X into a system of upper and lower probabilities over subsets of Y. Shafer [15] calls upper and lower probabilities plausibility and belief functions. Our aim in this paper is to pursue further the modal logic interpretation of Dempster±Shafer theory by employing notions and concepts from set-valued analysis. The attractiveness of the multivalued (or set-valued) interpretation, presented in this paper, lies in its natural analogy to the original approach of Dempster [8] . In fact, as far as we manage to construct a multivalued mapping that establishes a correspondence between the set of possible worlds and the set of atomic propositions, we automatically obtain, without imposing any restrictions on the accessibility relation, that this multivalued mapping induces a plausibility measure and a belief measure.
Multivalued mappings
In this section, we recall some basic concepts from the theory of multivalued mappings [1, 3] . A multivalued mapping F from a universe X into a universe Y associates to each element x of X a subset p x of Y. The domain of F, denoted domp , is de®ned as domp fx j x P p x T YgX F is called non-void if Vx P p x T YY i.e. if domp .
Let us give an overview of the dierent direct and inverse images under a multivalued mapping needed further on. Consider a subset A of X and a subset B of Y.
(i) The direct image of A under F is the subset p e of Y, de®ned as p e xPe p xX
(ii) The inverse image of B under F is the subset p À f of X, de®ned as
The pure inverse image of B under F is the subset p À1 f of X, de®ned as
The above images have been studied by various people under dierent names [1±3,6] . We adopt here the terminology used by De Baets and Kerre [6] . Note that not all authors take into account the necessary restriction of the superinverse image to the domain of the multivalued mapping (see e.g. the approach of Bandler and Kohout [2] criticised in Ref. [6] ). The pure inverse image can for instance be found in Ref. [16] .
One easily veri®es that the inverse images of the empty set and of the universe Y are given by:
The following relationships hold among the dierent inverse images:
Let us consider a second multivalued mapping G from a universe Y into a universe Z. The composition of F and G is the multivalued mapping q p from X into Z de®ned by, for any x P :
Note that if F and G are non-void then also q p is non-void. Consider a subset C of Z. The inverse image of C under q p is given by:
Dempster±Shafer theory
The development of a mathematical theory of evidence, nowadays referred to as Dempster±Shafer theory, was initiated by Dempster in 1967 with the study of upper and lower probabilities [8] . Considering a probability measure P on P , he showed that a multivalued mapping C from X into Y induces upper and lower probabilities on P , as follows:
where C À C domCX It is clear that Ã and Ã are only well de®ned if domC b 0. In case of a ®nite universe Y, he observed that these upper and lower probabilities are completely determined by the quantities C À1 g, g P P .
Shafer reinterpreted upper and lower probabilities as degrees of plausibility and belief, abandoning Dempster's idea that they arise as upper and lower bounds over classes of Bayesian probabilities [15] . The formal de®nitions of plausibility and belief measures are given next: for any ®nite family e i n i1 in P . Note that plausibility and belief measures come in dual pairs. For any belief measure Bel on P , the P 3 0Y 1 mapping Pl de®ned by Ple 1 À Belco e is a plausibility measure on P . For instance, Ã and Ã are dual. Furthermore, in case of a ®nite universe Y, Shafer introduced the concepts of a basic probability assignment and its focal elements and of a commonality function [15] . Formally, they can be de®ned as follows [7, 15] :
(i) A P 3 0Y 1 mapping m is called a basic probability assignment on P if mY 0 and for any ®nite family e i n i1 in P . There exists a one-to-one correspondence between any of the concepts belief measure, plausibility measure, basic probability assignment and commonality function. Given a basic probability assignment m, the corresponding belief measure Bel and its dual plausibility measure Pl, and the corresponding commonality function Q are given by:
Conversely, given a belief measure Bel, the corresponding basic probability assignment m is given by:
given a commonality function Q, the corresponding basic probability assignment m is given by:
All other correspondences can be derived from the ones above.
Remark 3.1. It is interesting to observe that the upper and lower probabilities (7) can be interpreted as conditional probabilities of inverse and superinverse images given the domain of the multivalued mapping, as follows:
The corresponding basic probability assignment m is given by Ref. [8] :
Observe that, when mf b 0 it must hold that C À1 f T Y and hence
Wx P f CxX
Consequently, the focal elements are to be found in the set fCx j x P domCgX Moreover, as it is shown next, also the corresponding commonality function Q can be written in the same style, using conditional probabilities of subinverse images, as follows:
Indeed, one easily veri®es that for any subset B of Y it holds that:
It then follows that
Since the family C À1 f j f P P n fYg forms a partition of domC, we can write
Modal logic
Modal logic is an extension of classical propositional logic and has been developed to formalize arguments involving the notions of necessity and possibility [5] . These notions are often expressed using the idea of possible worlds: necessary propositions are those which are true in all possible worlds, whereas possible propositions are those which are true in at least one possible world. Possible worlds are abstract objects and their precise meaning could be hardly provided. Intuitively, we are to view them as possible states of aairs, situations, scenarios, etc.
The language of modal logic consists of a set of atomic propositions, logical connectives XY Y Y 3Y 6, and modal operators of possibility AE and necessity Ã. The sentences or propositions of the language are of the following form: · atomic propositions, · if p and q are propositions, then are so Xp, p q, p q, p 3 q, p 6 q, Ãp, AEp.
The interpretations of Dempster±Shafer theory that are discussed in this paper are based on the semantics of modal logic using the concept of a standard model. A standard model of modal logic is a triplet w h Y Y i, where W denotes a set of possible worlds, R is a binary relation on W called accessibility relation (we say that world v is accessible from world w when wRv), and V is the value assignment function by which truth T or falsity F of each atomic proposition p in each world w is assigned, i.e. wY p P f Y g. Since a proposition may have dierent truth-values in dierent worlds, the assignment function assigns the truth-values not to proposition constants alone, but to pairs consisting of a possible world and a proposition constant. Therefore the value wY p is to be thought of as the truth-value of p in w. The value assignment function is inductively extended to all propositions in the usual way. We only mention the extension to possibilitations, i.e. propositions of the type AEp, and necessitations, i.e. propositions of the type Ãp. For any proposition p and any world w P , one de®nes:
wY AEp @A Wv P wv vY p Y wY Ãp @A Vv P wv A vY p X Although it is impossible to say once for all what a model is, there always is the common idea of a set of possible worlds and a value assignment function [5] . Note that we will say that a proposition is true in a model just in case it is true in each possible world in the model. Furthermore, a proposition is valid in a class of models if and only if it is true in every model in the class.
A system of modal logic is any set of propositions closed under (contains the conclusion whenever it contains the hypotheses) all propositionally correct modes of inference. The theorems of a system of modal logic are just the propositions in it. A system of modal logic is sound with respect to a class of models of modal logic just in case every theorem of the system is valid in the class of models, and the system is complete with respect to this class of models if and only if every proposition valid in the class is a theorem of the system. Thus a system of modal logic is said to be determined by a class of models of modal logic if and only if it is sound and complete with respect to this class.
A system determined by a class of standard models is called normal. Any normal system contains the theorem AEp 6 XÃXp and is closed under the rule of inference
which expresses a general rule of modal consequence that a proposition is necessary if it is a consequence of a collection of propositions each of which is necessary.
The accessibility relation in a standard model expresses the fact that some things may be possible from the standpoint of one world and impossible from the standpoint of another. When we say that v is accessible from w, we mean that world v is considered as possible from the perspective of world w. Imposing various restrictions on the accessibility relation, we obtain dierent classes of standard models that determine dierent normal systems. For instance, in a model w h Y Y i, R is called serial if for all w P there exists v P such that wv and R is called re¯exive if for all w P it holds ww. Consider the following theorems:
re¯exive. Note also that the class of standard models with an equivalence relation as accessibility relation determines a normal system of modal logic known as 5 [5] . Since from here on we will only deal with standard models and normal systems, we will omit the adjectives standard and normal.
Let us use kpk w to denote the truth set of a proposition p, i.e. the set of all worlds in which p is true:
The structure of the truth sets of the dierent propositions is given by:
Existing approaches
In this section, we recall the modal logic interpretation of Dempster±Shafer theory developed by Harmanec et al. [9±12] . This work is closely related to that of Ruspini [13, 14] , which is based on a form of epistemic logic (equivalent in power to the system 5), but Harmanec et al. use a more general system of modal logic and also address the completeness of the interpretation. Ruspini's approach is a generalization of the method proposed by Carnap [4] for the development of logical foundations of probability theory, and has led to new formulas for combining dependent evidence and for utilizing conditional knowledge.
Harmanec et al. consider a model w h Y Y i and employ propositions of the form
e e ``a given incompletely characterized element is classi®ed in set A'', where P and e P P . As atomic propositions, they consider the propositions e fxg , for all x P . The propositions e e are then de®ned by the equations
Xe fxg e e xPe e fxg Y Ve P P n fYgX Furthermore, they assume that each world in the model M gives its own unique answer to the classi®cation question, i.e. the following holds:
Singleton Valuation Assumption (SVA): One and only one proposition e fxg is true in each world.
The latter implies that the following two theorems: · e · e fxg 3 X yT x e fyg are always true in M. Moreover, as a consequence e e 6 Xe co e is also true in M, i.e.
ke co e k w co ke e k w X
Finite case
In Refs. [9, 11] , a modal logic interpretation of Dempster±Shafer theory on ®nite universes was proposed in terms of ®nite models, i.e. models with a ®nite set of worlds. In this work, the accessibility relation R is assumed to be reexive, which corresponds to M being a T-model.
Theorem 5.1 ([11]).
A ®nite T-model w h Y Y i that satis®es SVA induces a plausibility measure l w and a belief measure fel w on P , de®ned by: 
In®nite case
In order to be able to develop a modal logic interpretation of Dempster± Shafer theory on arbitrary universes, Harmanec et al. [10] add to a model a probability measure on the set of possible worlds. Hence, a model of modal logic is now meant to be a quadruplet
where W, R and V are as above, and P is a probability measure on P .
As mentioned above, dierent systems of modal logic are characterized by dierent additional requirements on the accessibility relation R. In Ref. [10] , it is assumed that R is serial. It is clear that the seriality of R implies its nonvoidness. Formally, this requirement corresponds to considering a D-model.
The following requirements on the value assignment function V are also imposed:
(A) VeY f P P 2 Vw P e f A wY e e 3 e f Y (B) VeY f P P 2 Vw P e f Y A wY e e 3 Xe f Y (C) VeY f P P 2 Vw P wY e ef @A wY e e e f X It is important to notice that it is not necessary to add these requirements, since they follow from the standard way of evaluating the value assignment function. l w e kAEe e k w fel w e kÃe e k w X
The foregoing theorem expresses that Pl w e can be viewed as the probability of the set of worlds in which AEe e is true and that Bel w e can be viewed as the probability of the set of worlds in which Ãe e is true.
Theorem 5.6 ([10]
). The interpretation of plausibility and belief measures introduced in Theorem 5.1 is complete, i.e. for every belief measure fel (or plausibility measure l) on P , there exists a D-model M satisfying SVA and requirements (A)±(C) such that fel fel w (or l l w ).
Interpretation of Dempster±Shafer theory: a set-valued approach
As we already observed in Section 3, Dempster±Shafer theory is closely related to the theory of multivalued mappings. It is therefore our ambition to apply the powerful apparatus of the dierent inverse images under a multivalued mapping in the development of a modal logic interpretation of plausibility and belief measures, basic probability assignments and commonality functions. We again consider a model w h Y Y Y i with P a probability measure on P . As atomic propositions we consider propositions of the form e fxg , for all x belonging to some universe X. Furthermore, we assume that exactly one e fxg is true in each world, i.e. SVA holds.
Constructing a multivalued mapping in a model
From here on, we regard the accessibility relation R as a multivalued mapping from W into W. This consideration is based on the observation that every relation from a universe X into a universe Y can be characterized by means of a mapping from X into P . In this context, world v is accessible from world w if and only if v P w.
The extension of the value assignment function to possibilitations and necessitations can then be rewritten as follows, for any proposition p and any world w P :
wY AEp @A Wv P v P w vY p wY Ãp @A Vv P v P w A vY p X 11
Proposition 6.1. For any proposition p it holds that:
Proof. We will for instance prove the second equality. Since Vv P v P w A vY p is equivalent to w kpk w , it follows with the de®ni-tion of the superinverse image and Eq. (11) that wY Ãp @A w P kpk w co domX Ã
We now construct a mapping f from W into X, associating to each world w P the unique x P for which wY e fxg . It is clear that f is non-void. Note that for any single-valued mapping g from a universe X into a universe Y and any subset B of Y there exists only one inverse image, i.e. g À1 f g À f g f fx j x P gx P fgX Proposition 6.2. The inverse image of any e P P under f equals ke e k w , i.e.
f À1 e ke e k w X Proof. Consider a subset A of X, then the following chain of equivalences holds:
w P f À1 e @A Wx P ef w x @A Wx P e wY e fxg @A wY e e @A w P ke e k w X Ã Let C denote the composition of R and f, i.e. C f . Note that since f is non-void, it holds that domC dom. By Eqs. (5) and (11) we also have that, for any w P : Cw vPw f v fx j x P Wv P w vY e fxg g fx j x P wY AEe fxg g fx j x P w P kAEe fxg k w gX Proposition 6.3. The inverse and superinverse images of any e P P under C are given by
Proof. The ®rst equality follows immediately from Eq. (6) and Proposition 6.2. Using it, the second property in Eq. (1) and the fact that ke co e k w co ke e k w , we then easily obtain C e co C À co e co domC co À ke co e k w co dom co À co ke e k w co dom ke e k w X Ã Note that kÃe k w and kAEe k w domC. The following corollary then follows immediately from Propositions 6.1 and 6.3.
Corollary 6.1. The inverse and superinverse images of any e P P under C are given by C À e kAEe e k w C e kÃe e k w kAEe k w X
For any subset A of X, we de®ne the proposition q e as follows:
AEe fxg X Proposition 6.4. The subinverse image of any e P P under C is given by 
Basic probability assignments and commonality functions
In this section, we restrict our considerations to a ®nite universe X in order to pursue a modal logic interpretation of basic probability assignments and commonality functions. (9) it follows that the basic probability assignment m w corresponding to Pl w and Bel w is given by m w e C À1 e j domCX
In case e Y, we have that m w e co domC j domC 0X For any non-empty subset A of X, it follows with Proposition 6.5 that m w e kÃe e q e k w j kAEe k w X Ã In a similar way, the following theorem can be shown. It can be easily veri®ed that in case of a ®nite model with a re¯exive accessibility relation and a probability measure corresponding to a uniform probability distribution the set-valued interpretation of Dempster±Shafer theory presented here is the same as the one in Section 5.1.
Example
In this section, we illustrate the simplifying eect of our set-valued approach. We consider a set of worlds with cardinality 6, i.e. fw 1 Y w 2 Y w 3 Y w 4 Y w 5 Y w 6 g, and corresponding accessibility relation depicted in Fig. 1 . For each world also the element x P fY Y Y dg is indicated for which the atomic proposition e fxg is true. As probability measure P on P we consider the one corresponding to a uniform probability distribution, i.e. j ja6. The multivalued mapping C (from W into X) constructed from the model w h Y Y Y i is given in Table 1 .
Recall that the focal elements of the basic probability assignment m w induced by the model M are contained in the set ffgY fY Y dgY fY Y dggX The calculations can therefore be kept to a strict minimum. Using the expression m w e jC À1 eja4 and the expressions of Bel w , Pl w and w in terms of m w , Table 2 can be ®lled in easily.
Conclusion
In this paper, we have shown that the modal logic interpretation of Dempster±Shafer theory, developed by Harmanec et al., can be equivalently, Table 2 The Table 1 The multivalued mapping C and more transparantly, established using a set-valued approach, thereby preserving the analogy to the original approach of Dempster. We are convinced that in this way also Dempster's rule of conditioning, and the more general rule of combination, can be given a modal logic interpretation. The latter interpretations are stated as open problems in Ref. [12] . First results in this direction, based on multivalued mappings, are presented in Ref. [17] .
